Messiah University

Mosaic
Language, Literature & Writing Educator
Scholarship

Language, Literature & Writing

2020

Countering Racial Enthymemes: What We Can Learn About Race
from Donald J. Trump
Danny Rodriguez

Follow this and additional works at: https://mosaic.messiah.edu/langlitwrit_ed
Part of the Race, Ethnicity and Post-Colonial Studies Commons

Permanent URL: https://mosaic.messiah.edu/langlitwrit_ed/2
Sharpening Intellect | Deepening Christian Faith | Inspiring Action
Messiah University is a Christian university of the liberal and applied arts and sciences. Our mission is to educate
men and women toward maturity of intellect, character and Christian faith in preparation for lives of service,
leadership and reconciliation in church and society.
www.Messiah.edu

One University Ave. | Mechanicsburg PA 17055

Title: Countering Racial Enthymemes: What We Can Learn About Race from Donald
J. Trump
Author: Danny Rodriguez
Mentor: Megan Schoen
Issue: 3
Publication Date: November 2020
Stable URL:
http://constell8cr.com/issue-3/countering-racial-enthymemes-what-we-can-learn-a
bout-race-from-donald-j-trump/

constellations
a cultural rhetorics publishing space

Countering Racial Enthymemes: What We Can
Learn About Race from Donald J. Trump
Danny Rodriguez, Texas Christian University
“As a result of decontextualized and simplistic conversations about race,
great schisms in communicative and interpretive practices occur and
dialogue shuts down. The schisms, I argue, necessitate the continuation
of taboo-laden race discussions”
—Iris D. Ruiz, D
 ecolonizing Rhetoric and Composition Studies (4)
As a Mexican-American in a historically white field, I have observed discussions and
even scholarly presentations relating to race that represent convoluted concepts
such as racism, and even whiteness, as stagnant definitions ostensibly as a result of
public knowledge. Race appears without qualifiers in the titles of conference
presentations, journal articles, and books, implying that as a concept race is
inherently unambiguous. Despite the scholarship that focuses on race and the
racial blind spots in that research, a major problem in our approach to
race—particularly grounded in cultural contexts—is the enduring assumption that
we all interpret race in the same way at all times. In terms of my own positionality, I
did not always prioritize a definition of race. Potentially similar to others, I expected
academics and even students to either share or be familiar with my interpretation
of race. To me, race is a social construct, but it is also a metaphor that has real
effects and a fluid base. As I.A. Richards contends, all language is metaphorical
(92-99). While my DNA may be similar to other Mexican-Americans, our experiences
and spaces of theorizing vary. Because of these differences, our definitions evolve
and may clash at times. However, I am content with this realization because I can
only then hope that we complicate every definition to ensure that our
conversations about race never become static. As I will discuss in this essay, we are
not always cognizant of competing definitions of race as we attempt to differentiate
between and discern overt and subtle racialization. To convey the significance of
explicit and implicit definitions concerning race, I turn to the severity of racial
enthymemes.
As some scholars have argued, we can make hidden claims about race visible by
rhetorically analyzing enthymemes. In her contribution to R
 ace, Rhetoric, and
Composition t wo decades ago, Meta G. Carstarphen called attention to the
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implications of a racial enthymeme by analyzing this statement of a journalist, Carl
Rowan: “Bigotry, ethnic and r acial hatreds, the dark side of man’s nature, can never be
expunged from human life. It can only be controlled” (26; emphasis in original).
According to Carstarphen, Rowan’s statement becomes the following enthymeme:
the major premise is “Bigotry and ethnic and racial hatreds (A) are the dark side of
human nature (B),” the minor premise is “Every man (C) has a dark side to his
nature because he is human (B),” and the conclusion is inevitably “Every man (C)
has bigotry and ethnic and racial hatred in him (A)” (28). Carstarphen criticizes this
enthymeme because Rowan represents implicit arguments as truths: Rowan
asserts that hatred has a relation to darkness, and he subtly claims that hatred is
dark, and the opposite of hate, love, is lighter (i.e., love is white); furthermore,
universal definitions of terms such as “racial hatreds” exist, and racism is inexorable
(28). Carstarphen reveals that without even using the term race, authors can make
racialized claims about particular identities. If an audience fails to detect an
enthymeme or elects not to parse the implications of the enthymeme, an author’s
assertions about race will remain invisible and naturalized. Although the field has
not adequately developed Carstarphen’s research, I draw our attention to
contemporary racial enthymemes within political, pedagogical, and academic
contexts to highlight the need for solutions in our present moment.
Matthew Jackson postulates that an understanding of how enthymemes operate
within racial discourse provides white people with the rhetorical ability and space to
confront their own racism. By examining racial enthymemes in relation to
whiteness, he argues, “Racist enthymemes can function to support arguments for
white supremacy inconspicuously and indirectly” (606). According to Jackson, these
racial enthymemes construct “an enthymematic relationship” between “the
hegemonic premises and claims of white supremacy” and white people (607-08).
Jackson does partially recognize his own accountability by reiterating that the
silence of whites means that they are complicit in upholding white supremacy (626).
However, to truly “learn how to identify whiteness . . . and to work against it,” we, as
a field, have to propose practical resolutions because, as Krista Ratcliffe suggests,
simply identifying racially coded enthymemes to recognize whiteness or racism
does not solve the issue (629). While Ratcliffe calls attention to Jackson’s white guilt
and blame (287), she also discusses how “the pedagogical challenge remains to
make whiteness visible and to help others . . . articulate how we are all personally
implicated . . . in systemic whiteness” (288). To answer Ratcliffe’s call to make
whiteness evident, I develop Jackson’s research concerning the racial enthymeme
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from my standpoint of a person of color and offer a potential solution during these
particular times.
I argue that expressing a working definition of race in our own research will
mitigate or minimize (un)intentional racial enthymemes. I also argue that we have
to remain rhetorically sensitive to our working definitions even when we examine
the racial enthymemes of others. To emphasize its intricacies, I first provide an
overview of the enthymeme. Second, to illustrate the overwhelming prevalence of
contemporary enthymemes and the importance of definitions, I analyze racialized
comments of Donald Trump as ready examples of how whiteness unapologetically
operates in officially sanctioned, public spaces. Third, I discuss the consequences of
absent definitions of race and the unintentional enthymeme by examining the
arguments of two scholars, Jennifer Clary-Lemon and Amy Goodburn, who
contribute to our conversations about race but do not offer their own definitions of
it. As exemplary models of research that focus on race, these scholarly works allow
me to illustrate how we can take substantial contributions even further by
stimulating racial awareness at the levels of definition and positionality. Finally, I
call for an academic obligation among scholars to define race particularly when we
utilize the concept in our scholarship. Consequently, we may become more aware
of racial enthymemes and our own positionality.

Figure 1: “Donald Trump head as a doll”
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Racial Enthymeming and Donald J. Trump
Since Aristotle stated that “the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism” and “for [in
rhetoric] the conclusion should not be drawn from far back, nor is it necessary to
include everything” (168-69), scholars have expounded the meaning and functions
of an enthymeme (e.g., Burnyeat, Dyck, Raymond, and Walton). In his attempt to
characterize the enthymeme, Lloyd Bitzer claims that audience determines the
effectiveness of an enthymeme as he argues, “The enthymeme succeeds as an
instrument of rational persuasion because its premises are always drawn from the
audience” (408). As Jackson1 has noted, Bitzer’s view of an audience is problematic
in regard to enthymemes because we cannot ignore the position and responsibility
of an audience. Since—as Grimaldi expresses—probabilities and signs2 are “the
sources for argument by” rhetorical enthymemes (115), unstated premises should
warrant critical observation since they do not have to be “universally true” to
persuade (Corbett 64). If we accept the syllogistic nature of an enthymeme, an
audience ought to object to any controversial implied premises, but such a
call-to-action becomes complicated as we reflect on the basic structure of an
enthymeme.
As recent as 2018, James Fredal problematizes our interpretations of the
enthymeme by arguing for a more accurate reading of Aristotle: “To create an
enthymeme, you don’t write a syllogism and elide a premise; you tell a story and
highlight a significant fact” (37). According to Fredal, an enthymeme “asserts and
invites the audience to attend to . . . a stated and accepted fact,” “places the fact in a
narrative context,” “helps frame and answer the legal question at issue,” and
“inverts the opponent’s argument” (34).3 An audience comprehends an enthymeme
of a rhetor because it likely already accepts a position as factual. The rhetorical
choices of a rhetor, such as providing a narrative context, then, remind an audience
of a shared truth. Fredal’s definition advances our understanding of the
enthymeme while uncovering a significant and yet troubling detail. On one hand, a
traditional perception of the enthymeme undervalues its rhetorical potential by
Jackson argues, “Bitzer’s definition of the enthymeme has been criticized because it places the
completion of the enthymeme in the complicit moment of agreement or understanding” (612).
Agreement and understanding suggest that an audience may not want to openly disagree or
demand for clarifications from a rhetor (615-16).
2
“Aristotle distinguished two kinds of signs that figure in an enthymeme—infallible and fallible. An
infallible sign is that which invariably accompanies something else. . . . If a sign does not invariably
and exclusively accompany something else, it is fallible—that is, any conclusion drawn from a sign of
this kind will always be open to refutation” (Corbett 63).
3
Fredal explains, “Not every enthymeme achieves all four goals, but the closer it comes, the more
enthymematic it is” (34).
1
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limiting it to a syllogistic structure; consequently, we, as rhetorical critics, should not
restrict an enthymeme to a rigid configuration. On the other hand, Fredal’s
reinterpretation of the enthymeme in practice would appear as fact-based; in other
words, an audience understands an enthymeme because the enthymeme is or
appears truthful. Although Fredal qualifies his definition and states that an
enthymeme is irrefutable because an “opponent cannot easily refute” it or an
audience would likely recognize the conclusion of an enthymeme as “unavoidable”
(39-40). While what an enthymeme is remains imperative for this discussion, what an
enthymeme offers c an have racial implications. Rhetorical awareness of how an
enthymeme operates in other areas, such as the teaching of writing (see Green;
Gage; Emmel), intertextuality (see Scenters-Zapico), embodied rhetorics (see
Prenosil), and visual rhetoric (see Finnegan), encourages us to assess how it
influences everyday lives.
Before I discuss the importance of them in defining race, I consider how
enthymemes can be racially coded by analyzing only a few of the many illustrative
enthymemes that Donald J. Trump has constructed in his interviews, speeches, and
Tweets. As Jennifer R. Mercieca states in her contribution to F aking the News: What
Rhetoric Can Teach Us About Donald J. Trump, “Donald Trump’s 2016 election to the
presidency of the United States was a political rupture—it represented a break with
traditional presidential campaign rhetoric as well as a break with a traditional
presidency” (174). While I apply a racial lens to this rupture, we cannot completely
decipher Trump’s rhetorical practices and the effects of his practices without
considering his presidency in relation to women, immigrants, the LGBTQIA+
community, Muslims, and every other group of people that Trump has further
marginalized. As Patricia Roberts-Miller states, “If we are intent on preventing
another Hitler, as scholars of rhetoric should be, we should not just focus strictly on
Hitler or his rhetorical strategies. Rather, we should ask what made his
demagoguery powerful at some times and not powerful other times—why did the
same rhetoric sometimes gain compliance and sometimes not?” (234-35). As
upcoming sections will reveal, the lack of a foundational definition for race has
made Trump’s demagoguery powerful and unchecked.
In “Donald Trump’s Racism: The Definitive List,” David Leonhardt and Ian Prasad
Philbrick—journalists for T he New York Times—compile a plethora of examples of
Trump’s racist rhetoric. Without offering definitions of race and racism while
labeling Trump’s rhetoric as racist (which it is from my position), they have to
operate with ambiguous and unsaid, but present, working definitions for race,
racism, and racialization to even reach this conclusion. Frankie Condon and
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Vershawn Ashanti Young, by contrast, present a clear working definition of racism
as “racial prejudice coextensive with the unequal distribution of power within
communities, instructions, and/or systems. In other words, or framed as an
equation: race prejudice + power = racism” (14). In order to define racism, though,
we would need more: we would also have to establish a definition for racial
prejudice4, and this construction would be based on our definition of race.5 The
racial enthymemes from Trump that I consider here do more than suggest that he
is racist; they emphasize the need for us to vocalize, with clarity and detail, our
working definitions for race and related concepts.

Figure 2: ARABIC 2 “Protest Signs”

To investigate the everyday effects of widely broadcasted and circulated
enthymemes, I turn to some examples relating to Trump. While these enthymemes,
unfortunately, are not necessarily unique, they represent what many of us can
overlook if we do not uphold and apply a constant rhetorical lens to his rhetoric.
Decades before Trump became U.S. President, his racial unawareness should have
been obvious: “In 1989, on NBC, Trump said: ‘I think sometimes a black may think
Condon and Young define racial prejudice as “dislike, distrust, or fear of others based on perceived
racial differences. Individual racial prejudice is learned and, at the early stages or antiracist
awareness, is often unconscious” (13).
5
According to Condon and Young, race is “a social construct. A historical concept rather than a set of
‘natural’ categories that orients around the classification and ordering of human beings in service of
domination. While race is an i maginary, the idea of race continues to have material consequences
and to condition the lived experiences of both whites and people of color” (13).
4
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they don’t have an advantage or this and that. I’ve said on one occasion, even about
myself, if I were starting off today, I would love to be a well-educated black because
I really believe they do have an actual advantage” (qtd. in Leonhardt). Trump’s
troubling message that “they do have an actual advantage” points to an unsaid and
ambiguous reference: it “functions as an enthymeme because the audience can
think of possible ways to complete it by supplying the missing premises and
conclusions based on shared assumptions and values” (Jackson 617). According to
Trump’s message, a missing premise could be that blacks who are not well
educated do not have an advantage. The obvious conclusion would, then, be that
blacks need to be well educated. Unfortunately, this conclusion is dangerous since
Trump seems to only want to trade his whiteness for blackness if he were “a
well-educated black,” thereby arguing that whiteness is always advantageous
regardless of what it means to be well educated. By using racial enthymemes, a
person can reinforce systemic racism by openly admitting one’s white privilege
while attempting to appear as racially aware when making racist remarks.
During Trump’s presidential campaign, his early remarks about undocumented
Mexicans induced many of his audience members to identify6 with him as a result
of his employment of enthymemes. Trump expressed, “When Mexico sends its
people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending
you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those
problems . . . They’re bringing drugs, they’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And
some, I assume, are good people” (qtd. in Leonhardt). His oratory contains not one
but two enthymemes about the dichotomy of so-called Americans and Mexicans.
These enthymemes can have the following forms:
First Enthymeme:
Undocumented Mexicans are not ideal citizens
Undocumented Mexicans are not like “Americans” (i.e., Trump’s audience
members)
The missing premise is “Americans are ideal citizens.”
Second Enthymeme:

I use identification as Burke explains it: “You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” (A
Rhetoric of Motives 55).
6
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Many undocumented Mexicans are criminals; therefore, they do not belong
in the U.S.
The missing premise is “Americans are not criminals.”
As recent as 2019, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, 60.4% of the U.S.
population, which lives on Indigenous land, is classified as “white alone” (i.e., “not
Hispanic or Latino”), and a nationality is always already racialized due to its racial
and ethnic demographics (“QuickFacts''). Critics of the two enthymemes in the
examples above have likely ascertained the racial coding of his message. The
utilization of nationalities, as Victor Villanueva argues in “Blind,” prompt the erasure
of race. Therefore, those who accept the enthymeming of Trump would likely
support nominalism7 but it is difficult to even presume Trump’s definition of race in
this particular context. However, together, these enthymemes are effective if
Trump’s target audience agrees with the linkages that they create. According to
Jeffery Walker, beyond a “quasi-syllogistic structure of claim-because-premise,” an
enthymeme draws “from what Perelman has called a ‘web’ or a network of
oppositions and . . . l iaisons” to engage the audience and to “foreground stance and
motivate identification with that stance” (56). Enthymemes, then, “set up” the
liaisons and oppositions (56) that contribute to our cultural networks of people and
associations. As someone who is not part of this cultural network of Trump
supporters, my scholarly and personal commitment to anti-racism motivate me to
identify potential implications of his enthymemes. His enthymemes do not
reinforce my cultural network; however, reinforcing my cultural network, or
embracing anti-racism, does not appear to be his goal. In other words, an
enthymeme is not simply a rhetorical syllogism but also a cultural practice that
reaffirms or challenges the networks and associations that cultures develop.
Trump has even defended himself against the label of racist as he explained, “I’m
not a racist. I am the least racist person you have ever interviewed, that I can tell
you” (qtd. in Shear). Regardless of intent, he constructs an enthymeme that reveals
a grave contradiction:
Another racial enthymeme:

As Linda Martín Alcoff argues in Visible Identities, three distinct views about race dominate our
conversations about the subject. She claims that “nominalism” is a view which posits “race is not
real . . . because recent science has invalidated race as a salient or even meaningful biological
category” (182). If an individual endorses such a definition, this individual may also perceive
racialization and racism as invalid. However, nominalism does represent one definition of race.
7
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I am not a racist because I am the least racist person you have conversed
with in your life.
The troubling implied premise would then be, “The least racist person is not really
racist.”
Racism existing in a spectrum does not mitigate racial tensions or the effects of
racism but rather exacerbates these tensions and effects. The troubling implication
of this enthymeme is that a U.S. president has a particular definition of racism that
allows him to justify the intent and consequences of his rhetoric. Furthermore,
Trump is able to communicate this implied premise to an audience that can, in
turn, weaponize it. In “Trump, the KKK, and the Versatility of White Supremacy
Rhetoric,” James Chase Sanchez posits that Trump “uses language in ambiguous
ways that might imply a specific meaning to one group and something else to a
different group” (49). Trump denying that he is racist constructs an implied premise
that (un)intentionally authorizes a white supremacist attitude: as long as a person is
not the most racist person, a moderately or even severely racist person can
overlook his or her own racial unawareness. This white supremacist attitude
remains since definitions of concepts like racism remain unexpressed and,
therefore, ambiguous.
In response to the riots that occurred due to the murder of George Floyd, Trump
threatened to use the U.S. military to silence angry and hurt voices expressing
themselves in various forms of protesting. Despite the graphic footage of the death
of George Floyd, Trump explains:
A police precinct has been overrun here in the nation’s Capitol, the Lincoln
Memorial and the World War II Memorial have been vandalized. One of our most
historic churches was set ablaze. A federal officer in California, an African American
enforcement hero was shot and killed. These are not acts of peaceful protests,
these are acts of domestic terror. The destruction of innocent life and the spilling of
innocent blood is an offense to humanity and a crime against God. (Gregorian
“Trump says he will deploy military”)
Racial Enthymemes Regarding George Floyd:
Overrunning a police precinct, vandalizing a memorial, burning a church, and killing
law enforcement are acts of domestic terror, offenses to humanity, and crimes
against God.

constell8cr.com

10

constellations
a cultural rhetorics publishing space

A dangerous implied premise is, “The death of George Floyd is not an act of domestic
terror, offense to humanity, or a crime against God.”
Trump clearly equates land, property, and the police to innocent life and innocent
blood. Additionally, he equates protestors to vandals and domestic terrorists.
Despite all the troubling enthymemes within this section of his speech, a crucial
missing premise involves Trump’s perception of George Floyd. Since Trump does
not explicitly mention George Floyd, Trump suggests that the murder of George
Floyd was not “an offense to humanity and a crime against God.” These
enthymemes are racial since they have racial implications. For an audience that is
more concerned about various forms of protesting, this audience will likely
continue to disregard George Floyd, or the racism which caused these protests. In
regard to an audience that seeks racial justice, we will recognize Trump’s inability to
confront systemic racism. In the following section, I will continue to focus on the
truncated syllogism to demonstrate the consequences of unapparent definitions.
Unstated Definitions and Unintentional Racial Enthymemes
In addition to the presence of enthymemes in our media and classrooms,
enthymemes exist in our own scholarly research. As rhetoricians, we possess the
positionality and necessary tools to minimize such enthymemes. To understand the
function of racial enthymemes in our own field, we have to reconsider the
importance of definitions by reviewing our own scholarly standards. Since
definitional differences obstruct dialogue, rhetorical critics, to discover the cause of
such differences, should begin with focusing on foundational concerns not
expressed in usage. In D
 efining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning, Edward
Schiappa postulates, “Definitions typically are treated as reporting one of two kinds
of fact . . . a fact of essence” or “a fact of usage” (6-7). As fact of essence considers
what “X really or truly is” while a fact of usage acknowledges how people employ
terms in their daily conversations (6-7). In other words, people can dispute whether
or not a definition is accurate or if a person correctly utilizes a term based on the
standards of its definition. Differences can result from either “a definitional gap” or
“a definitional rupture” (8). According to Schiappa, a definitional gap occurs when a
person does not understand a word and resorts to finding a definition (8), whereas
a definitional rupture transpires when a person encounters discourse that employs
words which contradict recognized definitions of such words (e.g., “‘That song is
really b
 ad’” offers conflicting connotations and denotations with how many define
and elect to use and perceive “bad”) (8-9). To state pointedly, if a person is
unfamiliar with a term and seeks an immediate or working definition, the situation
creates a definitional gap. If a person questions the usage of a word because he or
constell8cr.com
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she does not believe the word applies to the context, this situation establishes a
definitional rupture. When we acknowledge the concept of race, a definitional gap
or rupture (or both) is possible because race does not have a single definition.
Identifying those gaps and ruptures in our scholarly works may be especially
important for productive discussions of race.
Choosing to use a certain word or phrase in a specific way is rhetorical, of course,
and ignoring the possible ruptures of such usage discloses an absence of
awareness. Schiappa argues that “definitions are always political. . . . definitions
always serve interests and advance values, and they always require the exercise of
power to be efficacious” (177). When it comes to scholarly argument, in particular,
definitions directly affect the power and benefits granted to a scholar, and too
often, not specifying definitions can be convenient or even advantageous. For
example, a scholar who does not state his or her conception of race can succeed in
advancing a conversation without accepting the responsibility, and avoid the risk of
working through the process of constructing or realizing a definition. Neglecting
this responsibility forestalls a process that could otherwise force a scholar to revise
the definition or possibly acknowledge any complicating issues with his or her
positionality. Additionally, without a clear definition from the outset, the author
neglects the responsibility for rectifying definitional gaps and ruptures—or to raise
awareness of them, especially when they concern language that has real
consequences.

Figure 3: “It’s A Privilege To Educate Yourself About Racism”
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We need to consider some fundamental issues concerning what we mean by race
and what race may mean to each particular individual. In “The Language of
Narratives,” Sheila L. Carter-Tod states that a racial identity contains seven
components8 (136), and with so many factors in a racial identity, our approaches to
race should be nuanced and unique. In addition to nominalism, Linda Martín Alcoff
defines two other central positions on race. She labels the second view as
“essentialism” since this position views race as “an elemental category of identity,”
suggesting that “racial groups share a set of characteristics, a set of political
interests, and a historical destiny” (182). This position also becomes problematic if
we consider the potential dangers of assuming that people of any color have innate
qualities and predictable behavior; yet again, we have to acknowledge that this
essentialist view endures. Lastly, she claims that “contextualism” endorses race as a
social construction. This construction is, then, “historically malleable, culturally
contextual, and reproduced through learned perceptual practices” (182). In this
well-established framework, even though we may define race as a social
construction, our approaches to it can also embrace nominalism or even
essentialism—or prioritize specific identity components, highlighting the
significance of explicit definitions. In the discussion that follows, I analyze one
example that represents the absence of a definition of race and another example
that contains a racial enthymeme due to an unarticulated definition, both of which
show that whatever frameworks are in play, definitional clarity is a must.
In her examination of how scholars discussed race over a sixteen-year time period,
Jennifer Clary-Lemon offers several significant insights about the ambiguity of race
in College Composition and Communication (“The Racialization of Composition
Studies”). As her data conveys, scholars defined race as a “social construction” or
explained race through language that related to the concepts of “diversity” and
marginalization (6). She asks academics to acknowledge “that we encode race” and
that this encoding has effects (14). I would add, importantly, that we also implicitly
or explicitly encode race through how we choose to define, or not define, race.
Despite Clary-Lemon’s conclusions about encoding concepts, she does not supply
her own definition of the concept. She cites Henry Louis Gates, who suggests race is
simply a social construction, mentions how “social constructionists” perceive “race”
as an “arbitrary and ideological categorization,” and discusses how Keith Gilyard
implies that “race” is “multidimensional” (3-4). She works with others’ definitions of
race, however, without providing her own.
These components include “cultural attachment,” “early experience and socialization,” “political
awareness and orientation,” “spirituality,” “social and historical contexts,” “physical appearance,”
“racial ancestry,” and the “other social identities” category (136).
8
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I am not critiquing Clary-Lemon’s overall argument. In fact, I agree with her stance.
However, her own failure to define race leaves readers with no other choice than to
accept that they should share the same definitional framework of race, to ignore
the various ways we all can explain race, or to speculate about what race is to
Clary-Lemon. For example, she problematizes “terms like ‘difference’” and even
states, “Thus both publicly and professionally, race and the use of language have
been intertwined, evident from the early 1970s until the end of 1990s” (10-11). Even
with the best intentions, theorizing about race without constructing a statement
that discloses a definition of race indicates the scholar as occupying a place of
privilege: producing research about race without the uneasy task of creating or
finding a definition of race and then analyzing all the implications of choosing that
tentative definition. While this type of privilege does not necessarily efface an
author’s positionality, such absences dilute authorial positionality because it signals
an absence of awareness—or at least an assumption that the audience shares the
same racialized worldview. I am not arguing that any scholars are fully aware of all
their privileges, but the assumption that a personal authorial definition of race is
unnecessary contaminates positionality with privilege and can unknowingly
produce racial enthymemes.
Succinct reflection and thorough analysis may not expedite or simplify the process
of concocting a definition for race. In “Racing (Erasing) White Privilege in
Teacher/Research Writing About Race,” for example, Amy Goodburn exposes her
own privilege and racialized experiences. Based on an ethnographic study of “a
class of eighteen students,” “ten men (eight white, one African American, and one
African American/Native American); eight women (six white and two African
American); and a white teacher,” Goodburn “as a participant-observer” presents her
field notes about a student discussion (73-75). She also analyzes her field notes,
such as the complications of selecting “social descriptors” for students who did not
self-identify themselves racially (75-79), and how the job market prompted certain
epiphanies, such as why Goodburn unknowingly paired student stories together
based on race, through a racial lens (80-83). In essence, she displays racial
awareness of being a white academic, which requires a level of metacognition.
Goodburn concludes, “Understanding racist relations of dominance and my
privileges of whiteness as a white woman professor within these relations is much
messier, an ongoing project in which I must always work to uncover and struggle
against the invisible norms of power that my culture affords me” (83). Goodburn
performs a task, filled with tension and discomfort, that does not make whiteness
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fully visible because her own interpretations of whiteness and race are
indiscernible.
She expresses, like scholars of color have also argued, that her understanding of
white privilege and race is an ongoing process that requires both revision and
reflection. Consequently, conversations and thinking about race and white privilege
will never end. Additionally, her experiences enlighten her theories about race,
thereby disseminating her positionality—she is reflecting on and processing both
her successes and failures. Despite her insights, however, she does not provide a
definition of race. Based on her conclusion, she subtly equates “my culture” with
“whiteness.” Therefore, “culture” and “whiteness” likely function as a metaphor for
race because they become substitutions for a term that she is implicitly referencing.
In effect, her employment of metaphors for race conceal the complexities of
whiteness, or specifically how she defines whiteness, and a self-serving form of
white privilege: discussing race without defining it.
In her reflection about her classroom discussions, she makes the following
statements: 1) “It’s also important to question why I focused on issues of race only
in the classroom populated with students of color” and 2) “And because the white
students generally did not view themselves as even having a race, there was
definitely a lesser degree of tension in discussing racial issues” (77-78). This
enthymeme for race could be described as: “I focused on race differently with my
students of color than I did with my white students; therefore, student demographics
affected my teaching.” Unfortunately, the unexpressed premise is that student
demographics then define race, which ultimately means that race is simply an optic
test. Again, this is not the author’s central definition for race. Rather, I am
highlighting the consequences of expecting an audience to complete an author’s
unclear conception of race and why we should continue to take a critical look at
scholarship about race.
An Academic Solution to the Racial Enthymeme
When spaces of theorizing and experiencing intersect, transparency with clarity is a
rhetorical imperative. Moving forward, a commitment to transparency in our
research warrants attentiveness and the explicit communication of our own
working definitions, which may relate to theory, experience, or both. While theory is
essential to literature studies, in “Working Definitions: Race, Ethnic Studies, and
Early American Literature,” Joanna Brooks discusses how our experiences inform
our motivations for our research and teaching. Brooks does not begin her analysis
of early American texts, specifically those of African-American and Native American
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voices, until she expresses her own working definition of race: “First, a few working
definitions: race, as I understand it, is an effect of racism. The idea of race came
into being as a means of organizing social relations in order to establish and
maintain political and economic domination” (313). As a person of color, I do not
pause to deconstruct or praise Brooks’s perspective on race. Instead, her argument,
and more importantly, her positionality become evident. She not only offers her
interpretation of race, but she also elects to o
 pen her argument with a working
definition. In addition to Brooks’s candor, her research also evinces two different
spaces that inform racial scholarship: people of color experience race in one space
and “European and Euro-American intellectuals” typically theorize about race in
another (316). Brooks theorizes about race, and she is transparent about working
from a space of theory, not experience. Her positionality is then lucid because
Brooks does not burden her readers with the responsibility of deducing her
definitional space. Though theorizing and experiencing about race may seem like a
dichotomy, these intersecting spaces can function as a bridge for productive
discussions of race in academia.
More recently, in Counterstory: The Rhetoric and Writing of Critical Race Theory, in
addition to offering both a “methodology and method” that relates to the
importance of racial theory to our field (21), Aja Y. Martinez provides one of her
syllabi. Because her course focuses on “Race Critical Theories,” Martinez’s course
description includes her definition of race: “‘Race’ in the United States is defined by
societal structure, human representation, and cultural representation to form a
‘common sense’ regarding racial order, meanings, and identity” (147). From an
educator’s point of view, expressing our own understanding of race conveys the
complexities, and, therefore, significance of race, to our students. As Martinez’s
course description suggests, defining race gives us the opportunity to explain (1)
what we mean by race and (2) how race also operates. In other words, without
explicitly expressing our working definitions, it is unlikely that we can have
productive and clear conversations about how to address racism.
Whether we are fond of academic conventions or not, genre conventions do exist.
As teachers, we may encourage our students to perform some of these
conventions, and as researchers, we may even prove we are aware of these
conventions, thus reaffirming their importance. Of course, one long standing
academic convention is to define concepts before deploying them. For example, if I
am using Burke’s concept of “recalcitrance” (Permanence and Change), I will likely
provide a definition for potential readers. Since race will not disappear and our
conversations about race will only continue and “the processes of defining race and
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racism must themselves be ongoing and incomplete” (Gutiérrez-Jones 27), I
propose a new academic convention as an obligation. If writing about race,
academics have to provide some type of authorial definition, whether rooted in
theory and/or in experience. I call for more scholarship that documents the results
and processes for defining race and other related terms (e.g., racial, racialization,
and racism).
WORKS CITED:
Alcoff, Linda Martín. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. Oxford University
Press, 2006.
Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, Translated by George A. Kennedy,
2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2007.
Banks, Clay. “Protest signs posted on the gate surrounding the White House.”
Unsplash.com, n.d., h
 ttps://unsplash.com/photos/uV9GPQA2fpg. Accessed 9 Oct.
2020.
Bitzer, Lloyd F. “Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited.” Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol.
45, no. 4, 1959, pp. 399-408.
Brooks, Joanna. “Working Definitions: Race, Ethnic Studies, and Early American
Literature.” Early American Literature, vol. 41, no. 2, 2006, pp. 313-20.
Burke, Kenneth. A
 Rhetoric of Motives. University of California Press, 1969.
---. Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 3rd ed., University of California
Press, 1984.
Burnyeat, M.F. “Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion.” A
 ristotle’s
Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays, edited by David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas,
Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 3-55.
Carstarphen, Meta G. “News-Surfing the Race Question: Of Bell Curves, Words, and
Rhetorical Metaphors.” Race, Rhetoric, and Composition, edited by Keith Gilyard,
Boynton/Cook Publishers, 1999, pp. 17-30.
Carter-Tod, Sheila L. “The Language of Narratives: Racial Identity Development and
the Implications for Writing Classrooms.” N
 arrative Acts: Rhetoric, Race and Identity,

constell8cr.com

17

constellations
a cultural rhetorics publishing space

Knowledge, edited by Debra Journet, Beth A. Boehm, and Cynthia E. Britt, Hampton
Press, Inc., pp. 129-44.
Clary-Lemon, Jennifer. “The Racialization of Composition Studies: Scholarly Rhetoric
of Race since 1990.” College Composition and Communication, vol. 61, no. 2, 2009, pp.
1-17.
Condon, Frankie, and Vershawn Ashanti Young. “Introduction.” P
 erforming Antiracist
Pedagogy in Rhetoric, Writing, and Communication, edited by Frankie Condon and
Vershawn Ashanti Young, The WAC Clearinghouse, 2017, pp. 3-16.
Corbett, Edward P.J. C
 lassical Rhetoric for the Modern Student. 3rd ed., Oxford
University Press, 1990.
Dyck, Ed. “Topos and Enthymeme.” R
 hetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric, vol.
20, no. 2, 2002, pp. 105-17.
Eades, James. “It’s A Privilege to Educate Yourself About Racism Instead of
Experiencing It!!!” U
 nsplash.com, n.d., h
 ttps://unsplash.com/photos/W5UJZF4lnIU.
Accessed 9 Oct. 2020.
Emmel, Barbara A. “Toward a Pedagogy of the Enthymeme: The Roles of Dialogue,
Intention, and Function in Shaping Argument.” R
 hetoric Review, vol. 13, no. 1, 1994,
pp. 132-49.
Finnegan, Cara A. “The Naturalistic Enthymeme and Visual Argument: Photographic
Representation in the ‘Skull Controversy.’” Argumentation and Advocacy, vol. 37, no.
3, 2001, pp. 133-49.
Fredal, James. “Is the Enthymeme a Syllogism?” Philosophy & Rhetoric, vol. 51, no. 1,
2018, pp. 24-49.
Gage, John T. “Teaching the Enthymeme: Invention and Arrangement.” R
 hetoric
Review, vol. 2, no. 1, 1983, pp. 38-50.
Goodburn, Amy. “Racing (Erasing) White Privilege in Teacher/Research Writing
about Race.” Race, Rhetoric, and Composition, edited by Keith Gilyard, Boynton/Cook
Publishers, 1999, pp. 67-86.
Green, Lawrence D. “Enthymemic Invention and Structural Prediction.” C
 ollege
English, vol. 41, no. 6, 1980, pp. 623-34.

constell8cr.com

18

constellations
a cultural rhetorics publishing space

Gregorian, Dareh, et al. “Trump says he will deploy military if state officials can’t
contain protest violence.” N
 BC News, 1 June 2020,
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-considering-move-invoke-in
surrection-act-n1221326. Accessed 9 Oct. 2020.
Grimaldi, William M. A. “The Sources of Rhetorical Argumentation by Enthymeme.”
Landmark Essays on Aristotelian Rhetoric, edited by Richard Leo Enos and Lois Peters
Agnew, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998, pp. 115-44.
Gutiérrez-Jones, Carl S. Critical Race Narratives: A Study of Race, Rhetoric, and Injury.
New York University Press, 2001.
Jackson, Matthew. “The Enthymematic Hegemony of Whiteness: The Enthymeme as
Antiracist Rhetorical Strategy.” JAC, vol. 26, no. 3/4, 2006, pp. 601-641.
Leonhardt, David, and Ian Prasad Philbrick. “Donald Trump’s Racism: The Definitive
List.” NY Times, 15 Jan. 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/15/opinion/leonhardt-trump-racist.h
tml. Accessed 9 Oct. 2020.
Letek, Max. “Donald Trump head as a doll.” Unsplash.com, n.d.
https://unsplash.com/photos/BMSgPVaoNa8. Accessed 9 Oct. 2020.
Martinez, Aja Y. C
 ounterstory: The Rhetoric and Writing of Critical Race Theory. National
Council of Teachers of English, 2020.
Mercieca, Jennifer R. “Afterword: Trump as Anarchist and Sun King.” F aking the News:
What Rhetoric Can Teach Us About Donald J. Trump, edited by Ryan Skinnell, Imprint
Academic, 2018, pp. 174-79.
Prenosil, Joshua D. “The Embodied Enthymeme: A Hybrid Theory of Protest.” JAC,
vol. 32, no. 1/2, 2012, pp. 279-303.
“QuickFacts: United States.” Census.Gov, n.d.,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218#PST045218. Accessed
9 Oct. 2020.
Ratcliffe, Krista. “In Search of the Unstated: The Enthymeme and/of Whiteness.” JAC,
vol. 27, no. 1/2, 2007, pp. 275-90.

constell8cr.com

19

constellations
a cultural rhetorics publishing space

Raymond, James C. “Enthymemes, Examples, and Rhetorical Method.” E
 ssays on
Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse, edited by Robert J. Connors, Lisa S. Ede, and
Andrea A. Lunsford, Southern Illinois University Press, 1984, pp. 140-151.
Richards, I.A. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Oxford University Press, 1950.
Roberts-Miller, Patricia. “Demagoguery, Charismatic Leadership, and the Force of
Habit.” R
 hetoric Society Quarterly, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 233-47.
Ruiz, Iris D. “Race.” D
 ecolonizing Rhetoric and Composition Studies: New Latinx
Keywords for Theory and Pedagogy, edited by Iris D. Ruiz and Raul Sanchez, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2016, pp. 3-15.
Sanchez, James Chase. “Trump, the KKK, and the Versatility of White Supremacy.”
Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric, vol. 8, no. ½, 2018, pp. 44-56.
Scenters-Zapico, J. “The Social Construct of Enthymematic Understanding.” Rhetoric
Society Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3/4, 1994, pp. 71-87.
Schiappa, Edward. Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning, Southern
Illinois University Press, 2003.
Shear, Michael D. “‘I’m Not a Racist,’ Trump Says in Denying Vulgar Comment.” N
 Y
Times, 14 Jan. 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/us/politics/trump-im-not-a-racist.html?hp&a
ction=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-r
egion&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news. Accessed 9 Oct. 2020.
Villanueva, Victor. “Blind: Talking about the New Racism.” The Writing Center Journal,
vol. 26, no. 1, 2006, pp. 3-19.
Walker, Jeffrey. “The Body of Persuasion: A Theory of the Enthymeme.” College
English, vol. 56, no. 1, 1994, pp. 46-65.
Walton, Douglas. “Enthymemes, Common Knowledge, and Plausible Inference.”
Philosophy & Rhetoric, vol. 34, no. 2, 2001, pp. 93-112.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Danny Rodriguez is a doctoral candidate at Texas Christian University. He
specializes in cultural rhetorics, specifically critical race theory and the rhetorics of
Hip-Hop culture. His most recent research, “Racial and Reconnective Literacies:
Malcolm X and a Literacy Event,” appears in Critical Insights: Malcolm X. His
constell8cr.com

20

constellations
a cultural rhetorics publishing space

upcoming article, “Reclaiming Malcolm X: Epideictic Discourse and African-American
Rhetoric,” will appear in Rhetoric Review.
ABOUT THE MENTOR:
Megan Schoen is an associate professor in the Department of Writing and Rhetoric
at Oakland University, where she serves as the director of first-year writing. Her
articles have appeared in Rhetoric Review, WPA: Writing Program Administration, and
The WAC Journal. She is a co-founder and co-managing editor of Present Tense: A
Journal of Rhetoric in Society.
PRODUCTION CREDITS:
Production Editors: Daisy Levi and Catheryn Jennings
Copyeditor: Mitch Carr
Reviewers: Cruz Medina, Raul Sanchez, Megan Schoen
Editorial Assistant: Catheryn Jennings and Tina Puntasecca

constell8cr.com

21

